Freedom to tweet under attack: An analysis of the X Corp. v. UOI judgement

Introduction

Over the past 2 decades Twitter, now X, has been one of the biggest social media platforms with around 27.3 million users from India. X in the past had has many issued regarding freedom of speech and what is and is not allowed on the platform, with Elon Musk himself weighing in numerous times. 

In the past X has tried to push back against India’s tightening grip over what content could or could not be posted on its platform. However, over the years it has seemed increasingly willing to bend to the will of government officials and take down content or block accounts as per their wishes. 

All this leads up to 5^th March, 2025 where X Corp. finally seemed to retaliate against the increasing stranglehold of the government by filing a writ petition under Article 226 to declare that Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Act, 2000 (IT Act) does not give any authority the right to issue information blocking orders, as they can only be issued under Section 69A of the Act and to declare the Sahyog Portal ultra vires. The Sahyog Portal is an online platform launched by Ministry of Home Affairs in 2024, that performs the task of sending takedown notices to internet intermediaries. 

Analysis of the judgement

In his 351 paged judgement the Justice M. Nagaprasanna of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the petition, diluted Shreya Singhal v. UOI and effectively gave Government the power to Section 79(3)(b) as a takedown mechanism with no accountability to anyone. There is much to be said about this judgement and the many gaps in it.

To understand the judgement, we must be familiar with the laws it references. Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act allows the government to notify an intermediary about unlawful content on the platform and places the burden on the intermediary to remove such content or risk losing safe harbour protection. X Corp. in this case claimed that the Sahyog Portal was being used as a censorship portal to take down any content that was found to be objectionable through Section 79(3)(b). This reliance on Section 79(3)(b) is preferred as it does not require the procedure and due diligence that Section 69A would require. 

Under Section 69A of the Act the government can block public access to online information, in this case certain tweets or accounts on X, if it is necessary on grounds of threatening the nation’s sovereignty, security, public order, etc. As held in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) blocking or takedowns under this section must happen in accordance with the grounds laid down in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 

However, one cannot simply issue a takedown under Section 69A, there is a procedure that must be followed which involves reasoned orders, hearings, and review. This is a long but careful procedure that ensures fairness and safeguards against unrestrained censorship. A decade ago, it was these safeguards that were emphasised by the Supreme Court in the Shreya Singhal judgement.

It is clear that the government is circumventing Section 69A by using the Sahyog Portal and Section 79(3)(b) to arm twist intermediaries to take down content. Sahyog creates a parallel system where takedowns can occur without the due procedure mentioned in Section 69A. In the court filings X Corp. showed that they were asked to take down 1,400 posts or accounts just between March 2024 to June 2025, most of which were issued through the Sahyog Portal. None of which meet the criteria set forward in Section 69A.  It urged the Court to declare that Section 79(3)(b) by itself does not allow takedowns and that the official process under Section 69A must be followed. 

The Court upheld the legality of Sahyog Portal and said that it “stands as a beacon of cooperation” and is used just to improve the efficiency of dealing with cybercrime and unlawful content.  As per the Court both Section 79(3)(b) and Section 69A can exist separately and one does not infringe the other according to the Court. This is because no new penal law is being created, as the content being reported is already prohibited in acts and statutes like Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The Court found that the Portal is just an administrative channel, “a digital post office”, and is not ultra vires in any way. 

While the Sahyog Portal does not create any new laws and is only an “administrative channel” to send takedown notices is true on paper, it ignores that in reality it is being used as a mechanism to of censorship by not following the procedure laid down in Section 69A. The judgement allows for this procedure to be ignored and bypassed by Sahyog. Without any review committee the Government can use Section 79(3)(b) as a censorship tool and there is no one to whom they are accountable. 

The Sahyog Portal mostly operates in the dark, as in users are not given a reason as to why their post was taken down, any warning beforehand, there are no public records as to how many accounts or posts are reported and no reason is given to the public. While the Court did state that a reason must be noted for takedown, they did not make it mandatory to publish the reason for takedown publicly. This erases any accountability and allows for these takedowns to happen practically in secret. 

Misinterpretation of foreign jurisprudence regarding freedom of speech

The whiplash one gets from the Court’s views on American and European legal philosophies about freedom of speech and their transplantation in India cannot be ignored either. For one the Court criticizes Shreya Singhal for its reliance on American jurisprudence and cases like Reno, but in the same breath references the American cases such as TikTok v. Garland (2025), Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (2025) and Moody v. NetChoice (2024) show the evolving legal opinion in America. 

The Court conveniently mentions the Take It Down Act 2025 as an example of this evolving jurisprudence but does not seem to comprehend or mention the complexities of the Act and how it differs from the IT Rules, 2021 when it comes to the language it uses and the protection it extends to social media platforms. The Act in question uses very specific language and defines the object of the Act, which is non-consensually shared intimate pictures or videos. In contrast the IT Rules, 2021 uses vague language and does not have any clear-cut definition of the objectionable content it seeks out to ban. 

The Act also states that prosecutors have to establish that the platform knew about the images being shared non-consensually and the harm the publication of such images has caused or harm it would have caused to the victim. This is the inverse of what the Union in this case is arguing for. 

Dilution of Shreya Singhal

The most important consequence however, remains the over-writing of Shreya Singhal. The Court stated that Shreya Singhal was outdated and could not be applied in the present case as Shreya Singhal dealt with IT Rules, 2011, which have been replaced now by IT Rules 2021. So, even though Sections 66A, 69A and 79 are still valid, the Shreya Singhal judgement is not applicable because of the change in IT Rules. 

The Court conveniently ignored the fact that the IT Rules, 2021 were built upon the foundation laid down by IT Rules, 2011 and thus the judgement cannot be set aside as outdated. And while much has changed the core of the judgement still remains intact. The values espoused by Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice Chelameswar in Shreya Singhal, of transparency, accountability and freedom of speech are just as relevant today as they were a decade ago. 

Comparison with Kunal Kamra v. UOI

It is interesting to compare the Karnataka High Court judgement to the 2023 Bombay High Court judgement in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2023). The petitioners in this case sought to challenge the constitutionality of Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT Act. The rule allowed ‘fact check units’ established by the government to take down any content on social media that it deemed to be spreading misinformation related to government affairs. As per this rule once content is flagged as promoting misinformation, the platform must take it down or risk losing its safe harbour protection. It is highlighted in the judgement that although Section 79(3)(b) is a non-penal provision and only gives notice to intermediary, this is simply an “illusion of choice” because in reality all social media platforms depend on the immunity provided to them by their safe harbour and will take any action to protect their immunity to not incur the wrath of the government. In the end the Bombay High Court held the rule as unconstitutional.

Both these cases must deal with the chilling effect of Section 79(3)(b) on freedom of speech in India and both judgements have opposing views. While the Bombay High Court in Kunal Kamra strikes down rule 3(1)(b)(v) as unconstitutional due to its vague and overreaching language, the Karnataka High Court effectively turns a blind eye to the same with respect to the Sahyog Portal. 

The future of X Corp. and Sahyog is not final yet. X Corp. has filed for an appeal. However, the judgement passed by the Karnataka High Court is worthy of analysis because of its troubling implications on the right to freedom of speech and expression for millions in India. While fighting cybercrime is and should always be a priority, it cannot be used as crutch to justify censorship. Walking the line between these two is difficult but not impossible with the correct guidelines and implementation of already existing laws. As held in  Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016), courts must try to balance these rights and not completely ignore/ destroy one right in favour of the other.